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Abstract
We study a continuous-time version of the optimal risk-sharing problem with one-sided
commitment. In the optimal contract, the agent’s consumption is a time-invariant, strictly
increasing function of a single state variable: the maximal level of the agent’s income realized
to date. We characterize this function in terms of the agent’s outside option value function
and the discounted amount of time in which the agent’s income process is expected to
reach a new to-date maximum. Under constant relative risk aversion we solve the model in
closed-form: optimal consumption of the agent equals a constant fraction of his maximal
income realized to date. In the complete-markets implementation of the optimal contract,
the Alvarez-Jermann solvency constraints take the form of a simple borrowing constraint
familiar from the Bewley-Aiyagari incomplete-markets models.
JEL classification: C61; D86
Keywords: Risk sharing; Limited commitment; Borrowing constraints
1 Introduction
Individuals, firms, and sovereigns alike face constraints on the amounts they can borrow.
There is a large literature exploring the relation between borrowing constraints and limited
contract enforcement.1 When contract enforcement is limited, lenders face the risk of borrower
default. The role of borrowing constraints is to mitigate this risk efficiently. In this paper, we
∗We thank an associate editor and a referee as well as B. Ravikumar, David Fuller, Paul Gomme, Francois
Gourio, Hari Govindan, Boyan Jovanovic, Ayca Kaya, Tatyana Koreshkova, Alisdair McKay, Jianjun Miao,
Dan Otchere, Leena Rudanko, Guillaume Vandenbroucke, Gustavo Ventura, seminar participants at Concordia
University, Boston University, Richmond Fed, 2009 Midwest Theory Meetings, and 2009 Summer Meetings of
the Econometric Society for helpful comments. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not
necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
†Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, borys.grochulski@rich.frb.org.
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1Examples of contributions to this literature include Alvarez and Jermann [3], Albuquerque and Hopenhayn
[2], Kehoe and Perri [13].
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contribute to this literature by studying an optimal contracting problem with limited enforce-
ment in a tractable continuous-time framework that allows us to obtain a sharp characterization
of the optimal contract as well as of the borrowing constraints that implement it.
Our analysis has two parts. In the first part, we study an optimal long-term contracting
problem between a risk-neutral, fully-committed, deep-pocketed principal and a risk-averse,
non-committed agent whose stochastic income process is a geometric Brownian motion. Au-
tarky represents the agent’s outside option. All information is public. In this setting, we show
that under the optimal contract the agent’s consumption can be represented as a strictly in-
creasing function of the maximal level of the agent’s income realized to date. In the optimal
contract, therefore, the consumption path of the agent is weakly increasing and constant when-
ever current income is strictly below its to-date maximum but strictly increasing when income
achieves a new all-time maximum. At all times, the optimal amount of risk-sharing is less than
full. If the agent’s preferences exhibit constant relative risk-aversion, his optimal consumption
is simply given by a constant fraction of the maximal level of his income realized to date.
To see the intuition behind our characterization of the optimal contract, suppose that the
principal is to deliver to the agent the level of utility exactly equal to the agent’s value of
autarky as of time zero. If the agent could commit to never defaulting, the optimal contract
would give the agent a constant consumption flow forever. This is because the principal is
risk-neutral, does not face a flow resource constraint, and discounts future payoffs at the same
rate as the agent. Under this full-insurance contract, the agent’s value of continuing with the
contract does not change over time, i.e., remains equal to his initial autarky value. Note now
that even when the agent cannot commit, the full insurance contract does not cause the agent
to default (revert to autarky) for as long as his income fluctuates below its time-zero level, i.e.,
for as long as the date-zero level remains the to-date maximum level attained by the agent’s
income process. This is because during any such time interval the agent’s autarky value—being
strictly increasing in income—fluctuates below the agent’s initial autarky value, which means
that the value of defaulting remains below the value of continuing with the contract (the agent’s
participation constraint is satisfied). Under the full-insurance contract, however, the agent will
default as soon as his income exceeds its time-zero level—i.e., when income attains a new to-
date maximum—precisely because the agent’s outside option value will at that point exceed the
value of continuing with the full-insurance contract. In order to prevent default, the principal
has to deviate from the full-insurance contract by increasing the agent’s consumption at that
moment (as the agent’s participation constraint binds), but not before then. So, even when the
agent cannot commit, the principal will give the agent a constant consumption level for as long
as the agent’s income is not at its to-date maximum. The same logic applies after an all-time
maximum has been realized and the agent’s consumption has been increased: consumption
remains constant until income hits its next all-time maximum level. And so on. Optimal
consumption, therefore, is always an increasing function of the current to-date maximum level
of income.
For a given amount lifetime utility that the principal provides to the agent, the future
consumption increases that are necessary under limited commitment imply that the initial
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consumption level delivered to the agent is lower than what it would be under the full-insurance
contract. The key question is by how much. The answer depends on the magnitude of the future
consumption hikes and on how soon they are expected to occur. The advantage of our model
is that we can use the properties of the geometric Brownian motion process to give an exact
answer to this question. We derive an explicit formula for the mapping from the current to-date
maximum income level to the optimal consumption level. At each point in time, the utility flow
the agent receives equals the level he would receive under full insurance less the increase in his
outside option value that will occur the next time his income reaches a new maximum divided
by the amount of time in which his income is expected to reach it. The increase in the outside
option value is measured by the first derivative of the agent’s autarky value function. The
amount of time before income reaches its next all-time maximum is an example of the so-called
hitting time. When income is a geometric Brownian motion, the expected discounted hitting
time needed in our formula is given by a simple, closed-form expression. Our continuous-time
framework therefore allows us to express the agent’s optimal consumption in terms of the agent’s
autarky value function, its derivative, and an expected discounted Brownian hitting time.
Our formula for the optimal consumption process allows us to provide a detailed charac-
terization of the dynamics of the agent’s continuation value in the contract and the principal’s
profit from the relationship. The agent’s continuation value is always positively correlated with
his income. This correlation, however, is almost always strictly less than what it would be in
autarky, except on a measure-zero set of times at which the agent’s participation constraint
binds, when the two are equal. This correlation decreases with the distance between the agent’s
current income level and it to-date maximum. Thus, for a given to-date maximum, the agent is
more fully insured at lower income levels. As the agent’s income approaches its current to-date
maximum, the degree of insurance provided to the agent decreases, i.e., the agent becomes
progressively more exposed to the volatility of his income process.
In the second part of the paper, we study a simple trading mechanism that implements
the optimal long-term contract. This mechanism consists of two trading accounts that work as
follows. The principal makes available to the agent a bank account, in which the agent can save
or borrow at a riskless interest rate equal to the principal’s and agent’s common rate of time
preference. The principal also gives the agent access to a hedging account, in which the agent
can transfer his income risk to the principal with fair-odds pricing. In the hedging account, the
agent faces no limits on the size of the hedge he can take out, i.e., he can transfer 100 percent
of his income risk to the principal. In the bank account, however, the agent faces a borrowing
limit. The borrowing limit is always greater than zero, i.e., the agent has access to credit. The
size of the borrowing limit depends only on the agent’s current level of income, and has a simple
characterization: it is equal to the total value of the relationship between the principal and the
agent. In this mechanism, the agent can freely choose his trading strategy and his consumption
process. As well, the agent can default (revert to permanent autarky) at any point in time.
We show that under these conditions, the agent’s equilibrium (that is, individually-optimal)
trading strategy replicates the optimal long-term contract. This two-account trading mech-
anism, thus, implements efficient risk sharing. In equilibrium, the agent never defaults and,
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despite being able to fully hedge his income risk at any point in time, the agent chooses a
hedging strategy that only partially insures his income.
As already mentioned, in an environment otherwise identical to ours but in which the agent
can fully commit, any efficient allocation of consumption would provide the agent with full
insurance. Such allocations can be implemented with a combination of a hedging account with
no restrictions on hedging and a riskless bank account with no restrictions on borrowing (other
than a never-binding no-Ponzi-scheme condition). Furthermore, the trading mechanism in
which borrowing limits are absent would not implement any efficient allocation of the limited-
commitment environment. This is because over the desired no-default equilibrium strategy
the agent would prefer to accumulate debt and default. The limited-commitment optimum,
therefore, is implementable if and only if the agent faces the borrowing constraint. In our
model, thus, a simple borrowing constraint is precisely the difference between an optimal trad-
ing mechanism in the limited-commitment environment (in which default risk is present) and
an optimal trading mechanism in the full-commitment environment (in which default risk is
absent). Our model, therefore, shows clearly the role of borrowing constraints in mitigating the
risk of borrower default.
The implementation exercise with the two-account trading mechanism provides two addi-
tional insights. First, it gives us a better understanding of the optimal long-term risk-sharing
contract by identifying a set of restrictions on trading consistent with optimal risk sharing that
are weaker than the strong restrictions implicit in the optimal long-term contract itself, where
no retrading is allowed. For example, the implementation exercise lets us see that the optimal
contract with limited commitment does not place any restrictions on how much the agent is
allowed to save. In dynamic risk-sharing problems with private information, in contrast, opti-
mal contracts typically do restrict agents’ savings (Rogerson [22], Golosov et al. [9]). Second,
the implementation exercise delivers a theory of optimal borrowing constraints. The standard
Bewley-Aiyagari incomplete-markets model does not endogenously determine what agents’ bor-
rowing limits should be. Our implementation delivers an optimal borrowing limit derived from
the underlying commitment friction.
Relation to the literature Our paper is closely related to the literature studying optimal
contracts and equilibrium outcomes in environments with commitment frictions. Contributions
to this literature include Harris and Holmstrom [10], Thomas and Worrall [24], Marcet and
Marimon [19], Kehoe and Levine [14], Kocherlakota [15], Alvarez and Jermann [3], Albuquerque
and Hopenhayn [2], Ljungqvist and Sargent [18], Krueger and Perri [16], Krueger and Uhlig
[17]. Our paper extends the analysis to a continuous-time setting with persistent shocks, which
allows for closed-form solutions and a detailed characterization of the dynamics of the optimal
contract and its implementation.2 Our method for the characterization of the optimal contract,
however, is not specific to our continuous-time framework. Zhang [26] shows how our method
2Monge-Naranjo [20] studies an optimal contracting problem with limited enforcement in continuous time. In
the model studied in that paper, there are no shocks (deterministic dynamics) and agents have no preference for
intertemporal smoothing (linear utility). In this paper, we study a stochastic model with a risk-averse agent.
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can be extended to a discrete-time model with a general Markov income process and a general
outside option value function.
Our paper is also related to several recent studies of optimal contracting problems in contin-
uous time with private information.3 In particular, our proof of the optimality of the contract
is based on the techniques developed in Sannikov [23]. Our analysis suggests that limited-
commitment environments are more tractable than private information environments, both in
the study of the optimal allocation and its implementation. In particular, in our model we can
provide closed-form solutions without value function iteration or having to solve a second-order
differential equation.
In addition to the optimal contracting papers, our paper is related to the papers studying
the role for restrictions on borrowing in mitigating the risk of default. In the existing literature,
this role has been studied in two contexts.
First, it has been studied in equilibrium models of borrowing and default that exogenously
restrict the contract structure to debt contracts (e.g., Eaton and Gersovitz [7]). In these models,
the equilibrium credit limits and other costs to access credit are not necessarily optimal. In
contrast, our analysis imposes no restrictions on the structure of the contract. The equilibrium
credit limits that we obtain are optimal, i.e., a part of a mechanism supporting the optimal
level of risk sharing with limited commitment.
Second, Alvarez and Jermann [3] study a general equilibrium economy with limited com-
mitment and impose no exogenous restrictions on the structure of the contract. They show
that optimal allocations can be implemented via decentralized trade in a complete set of state-
contingent claims if agents face solvency constraints that prevent default. The solvency con-
straints of Alvarez and Jermann [3] take the form of limits on portfolios of state-contingent
claims. Our model is essentially a continuous-time, partial-equilibrium version of the Alvarez-
Jermann model with one-sided commitment. Our analysis shows that in this setting the state-
contingent solvency constraints collapse to a simple borrowing constraint, which, literally, is a
limit on the amount the agent can borrow. Thus, the borrowing constraint that emerges in our
version of the Alvarez-Jermann model has the same form as the classic borrowing constraints of
the Bewley-Aiyagari-type models, which have been widely used in macroeconomics and finance.
Also, because we characterize the optimal contract in closed form and show that the borrowing
constraint in the implementation corresponds to the principal’s maximized profit value, we can
easily compute the borrowing constraints with no need for the fixed-point iteration procedure
used in Alvarez and Jermann [3].
Organization In Section 2, we present the environment and a general class of contracting
problems we study. In Section 3, we characterize the solutions to these problems. In Section
4, we study implementation and provide a characterization of optimal borrowing constraints.
In Section 5, we discuss extensions. In Section 6, we sum up our conclusions. Appendix A
contains proofs of all lemmas and propositions presented in the text. Appendix B contains
3E.g., Demarzo and Sannikov [6], Biais et al. [4], Sannikov [23], Piskorski and Tchistyi [21], He [11], Zhang
[25].
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a formal verification argument for the optimality of the contract characterized in Section 3.
Appendix C provides an application of our method to an optimal contracting problem with
two-sided lack of commitment.
2 The contracting problem
Consider the following dynamic contracting problem in continuous time. There is a risk-
neutral principal and a risk-averse agent. Let w be a standard Brownian motion w = {wt,Ft; 0 ≤
t < ∞} on a probability space (Ω,F ,P). The agent’s income process y = {yt,Ft; 0 ≤ t < ∞}
is a geometric Brownian motion, i.e., for t ≥ 0
yt = y0 exp(αt+ σwt),
where y0 ∈ R++, α ∈ R, and σ ∈ R++.
We assume that the principal and the agent discount at a common rate r. Preferences of
the agent are represented by the expected utility function
E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rtu(ct)dt
]
,
where ct is the agent’s consumption at time t, u : R++ → R is a strictly increasing and concave
smooth period utility function, and E is the expectations operator. The agent’s income process
y is publicly observable by both the principal and the agent. Since the agent is risk averse and
the principal is risk neutral, there are gains from trade to be realized between the principal
and the agent. The principal offers the agent a long-term contract in which he provides the
agent with a consumption allocation c = {ct; t ≥ 0} in return for the agent’s income process y.
We require that c be progressively measurable with respect to the filtration {Ft; t ≥ 0}. The
principal’s discounted cost of a contract with the agent’s consumption c is given by
E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rt(ct − yt)dt
]
.
To ensure that the value of the agent’s income process is finite, we restrict parameters to
satisfy
r > α+
σ2
2
, (1)
that is, we assume that the common discount rate is larger than the average growth rate of the
income process. We will denote α+ σ2/2 by µ. Also, for any t, the present value of the agent’s
future income (i.e., the agent’s “human capital,” or “human wealth”) will be denoted by P (yt).
Using the fact that E[yt+s|Ft] = yt exp(µs) for any t, s > 0, we have that
P (yt) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rsyt+sds|Ft
]
=
yt
r − µ. (2)
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The principal can commit to a contract, but the agent cannot. In particular, the agent
is always free to walk away from the principal and consume his income. If he does, he loses
all future insurance possibilities, i.e., he has to remain in autarky forever. Because income
is persistent, the value that the autarky option presents to the agent depends on the current
income level. Denoting this value by Vaut(yt), we have
Vaut(yt) = E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rsu(yt+s)ds|Ft
]
.
Let vt denote the conditional expected utility of the agent under allocation c from time t
onwards:
vt = E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rsu(ct+s)ds|Ft
]
. (3)
The agent will have no incentive to renege on the contract with the principal if the following
participation constraint,
vt ≥ Vaut(yt),
holds at each date t and in every state ω ∈ Ω. An allocation that satisfies these participation
constraints will be called enforceable.
We consider a family of contracting problems indexed by y0 and V¯ , where V¯ ≥ Vaut(y0) is
the total utility value that the principal must deliver to the agent. For each pair (y0, V¯ ) ∈ Θ ≡
{(y, v) : y > 0, v ≥ Vaut(y)}, the principal’s problem is to design an enforceable allocation c that
delivers to the agent utility V¯ at a minimum cost C(y0, V¯ ). That is, the principal’s problem at
(y0, V¯ ) is
C(y0, V¯ ) = min
c
E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rt(ct − yt)dt
]
(4)
s.t. vt ≥ Vaut(yt), all t and ω, (5)
v0 = V¯ .
Any contract that solves this problem will be called efficient. Let c(y0, V¯ ) denote an efficient
contract in the planner’s problem at (y0, V¯ ). For each (y0, V¯ ) ∈ Θ, the contract consumption
allocation c(y0, V¯ ) is a process on (Ω,F ,P) progressively measurable with respect to the filtra-
tion {Ft}. Let Ψ = {c(y0, V¯ ) : (y0, V¯ ) ∈ Θ} denote the family of all efficient contracts. Our
task is to characterize the contracts in Ψ.
3 Efficient contracts
This section is devoted to the characterization of efficient contracts. In order to provide eco-
nomic intuition, we first derive the efficient contracts heuristically and give the main properties
of these contracts. The formal verification of optimality is done in subsection 3.5. We start out
by considering the contracting problems in which all surplus is given to the principal. That is,
for a given y0, let V¯ = Vaut(y0). We postpone the analysis of the problems with V¯ > Vaut(y0)
until subsection 3.3.
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Let us first review the case of full commitment. The optimal contract under full commit-
ment provides full insurance to the agent. Since the principal and the agent discount at the
same rate, the optimal full-commitment contract provides the agent with constant consumption
u−1(Vaut(y0)). Under this contract, the agent’s continuation value is constant, i.e., vt = Vaut(y0)
at all dates t and in every state ω ∈ Ω.
Under one-sided commitment, this full-insurance contract is not feasible because the agent’s
autarky value Vaut(yt) will exceed Vaut(y0) when yt exceeds y0 for the first time. At this time,
the full-insurance contract would violate the agent’s participation constraint. As long as yt does
not exceed y0, however, the participation constraint does not bind. Inside the time interval in
which yt fluctuates below the initial level y0, thus, the principal’s profit maximization problem
is the same under both one-sided and full commitment. Therefore, the consumption path that
the principal optimally provides to the agent during this time must be constant in the one-sided
commitment case, as it is in the case of full commitment.
We now calculate the level of consumption that the principal will optimally provide to the
agent during this time interval. A technical difficulty associated with this calculation stems from
the fact that the length of the time interval in which the principal can provide full insurance
is zero, i.e., inft{t > 0 : yt > y0} = 0 almost surely.4 To deal with this difficulty, we first relax
the principal’s problem by a small amount and construct an optimal contract in the relaxed
problem. Then we take a limit of the optimal contract as the size of the relaxation amount
goes to zero. Finally, we check that the limiting contract is feasible in the unrelaxed problem.
We fix ε > 0 and drop the agent’s participation constraints vt ≥ Vaut(yt) for all t < τy0+ε,
where τy0+ε = mint {t > 0 : yt = y0 + ε} is the first time when the agent’s income reaches y0 +ε.
Because ε is strictly positive, τy0+ε > 0 almost surely, and thus the time interval [0, τy0+ε) has
non-zero length. In this relaxed problem, there are no participation constraints inside [0, τy0+ε)
and thus the principal provides full insurance to the agent over this time interval. At τy0+ε, the
principal provides the agent with continuation value
vτy0+ε = Vaut(y0 + ε), (6)
as this value constitutes the minimal departure from the full-commitment contract that ensures
that the agent’s participation constraint vt ≥ Vaut(yt) is satisfied at τy0+ε.
Under the above contract, the agent’s utility flow inside the interval [0, τy0+ε) is constant.
We will denote this utility flow level by u¯ε(y0). Using this notation and equation (6), the
agent’s expected utility from this contact can be split into the part before and after time τy0+ε
as follows:
v0 = E
[∫ τy0+ε
0
re−rtu¯ε(y0)dt+ e−rτy0+εVaut(y0 + ε)
]
.
Since the value being provided to the agent is V¯ = Vaut(y0), the constant utility flow rate u¯
ε(y0)
4This is because a typical path of Brownian motion has infinite variation and thus crosses y0 infinitely many
times immediately after t = 0.
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must be chosen at a level at which v0 = Vaut(y0). Thus, u¯
ε(y0) satisfies
Vaut(y0) = E
[∫ τy0+ε
0
re−rtu¯ε(y0)dt+ e−rτy0+εVaut(y0 + ε)
]
. (7)
Note also that under autarky, the autarky value Vaut(y0) can also be split into the value of the
consumption of income received up to the time τy0+ε and after:
Vaut(y0) = E
[∫ τy0+ε
0
re−rtu(yt)dt+ e−rτy0+εVaut(y0 + ε)
]
. (8)
Comparing (7) and (8) and canceling common terms, we obtain
E
[∫ τy0+ε
0
re−rtu¯ε(y0)dt
]
= E
[∫ τy0+ε
0
re−rtu(yt)dt
]
.
Thus, the utility flow rate u¯ε(y0) is the certainty equivalent of the stochastic utility flow rate
that the agent receives under autarky over the time interval [0, τy0+ε). For any ε > 0, the
optimal contract in the relaxed problem simply delivers full insurance until τy0+ε, and the
minimal continuation value required to satisfy the participation constraint at time τy0+ε.
By taking ε to zero, we now obtain a formula for the certainty equivalent utility flow rate
u¯(y0) in the unrelaxed planner’s problem:
u¯(y0) = lim
ε→0
u¯ε(y0)
= lim
ε→0
E[
∫ τy0+ε
0 re
−rtu(yt)dt]
E[
∫ τy0+ε
0 re
−rtdt]
= lim
ε→0
Vaut(y0)− E[e−rτy0+ε ]Vaut(y0 + ε)
1− E[e−rτy0+ε ] .
Denote 1− E[e−rτy0+ε ] by g(ε). Then, applying d’Hospital’s rule and using g(0) = 0, we get
u¯(y0) = lim
ε→0
g′(ε)Vaut(y0 + ε)− (1− g(ε))V ′aut(y0 + ε)
g′(ε)
= Vaut(y0)− V ′aut(y0)/g′(0).
This expression for the certainty equivalent utility flow rate is intuitive. Note that g(ε) ≈
g′(0)ε is the amount of discounted time spent before hitting y0 + ε, the income level at which
the participation constraint binds. If the constraint never binds, as is the case under full
commitment, then the discount factor at the hitting time is zero (i.e., E[e−rτy0+ε ] = 0) and
g′(0) ≈ ∞, in which case the formula for u¯(y0) collapses to the full-commitment level Vaut(y0).
Under limited commitment, however, the income level at which the participation constraint
binds, y0 + ε, is expected to be reached in finite time. At this time, τy0+ε, the agent expects
to receive V ′aut(y0)ε units of extra continuation utility. Thus, the constant flow rate u¯(y0) over
the interval [0, τy0+ε) is reduced below the full-commitment level Vaut(y0) by the amount of
the expected gain V ′aut(y0)ε divided by the expected discounted waiting time g′(0)ε, which is
reflected in the above formula for u¯.
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Using the structure of the agent’s income process y, we can characterize the certainty
equivalent utility flow rate more closely. Borodin and Salminen [5, page 622] show that if
y = {yt,Ft; 0 ≤ t <∞} is the geometric Brownian motion, then for any y ≥ y0
E[e−rτy ] =
(
y0
y
)κ
, (9)
where
κ =
(√
α2 + 2rσ2 − α
)
σ−2 (10)
is a strictly positive constant.5 Thus, g′(0) = κ/y0 and
u¯(y0) = Vaut(y0)− κ−1y0V ′aut(y0).
Having described the contract inside the initial time interval [0, τy0+ε), let us now consider
the continuation contract starting at time τy0+ε . As we noted before, since the participation
constraint binds at τy0+ε, the agent’s continuation value at τy0+ε equals his autarky value
Vaut(y0 + ε). The principal’s problem of designing a profit-maximizing contract is thus the
same at t = τy0+ε as it was at t = 0 but with the new initial value V¯ = Vaut(y0 + ε) and the
new initial income state y0 + ε. The solution to this problem, therefore, must be the same:
Consumption is stabilized until the agent’s income exceeds y0 + ε for the first time. The flow
utility provided in the meantime, u¯(y0 +ε), is at the level necessary to deliver value Vaut(y0 +ε)
to the agent given that the autarky value will be delivered to the agent as of the future moment
when income first exceeds y0 + ε. The same steps we used earlier to calculate u¯(y0) let us now
calculate u¯(y0 + ε) = Vaut(y0 + ε)− κ−1(y0 + ε)V ′aut(y0 + ε). And so forth.
Repeating this construction for all dates and possible realizations of income paths, we note
that under the resulting contract, current utility flow delivered to the agent at any t is de-
termined by the maximum level the income path attained up to time t. Denote this level
by
mt = max
0≤s≤t
ys.
Whenever income yt is strictly below mt, the value of mt remains constant. As we argued
earlier, at these times it is efficient to provide the agent with constant consumption flow. Thus,
mt can be used as a state variable sufficient to determine current consumption flow given to
the agent under this contract.
In sum, we have argued (so far heuristically) that the optimal contract delivering the value
V¯ = Vaut(y0) to the agent is given as follows. At any t ≥ 0, the agent’s consumption is given
by
ct = u
−1(u¯(mt)), (11)
where u¯ : R++ → R is
u¯(y) = Vaut(y)− κ−1yV ′aut(y), (12)
5In fact, (1) implies that κ > 1.
10
and where the constant κ > 1 is given in (10).
If the utility function u is given by a closed-form expression, the optimal contract can be
characterized more closely. The following example obtains a closed-form expression for the class
of utility functions satisfying constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).
Example If utility is logarithmic, u(c) = log(c), then
Vaut(yt) = E
[∫ ∞
t
re−r(s−t) log(ys)ds|Ft
]
=
∫ ∞
t
re−r(s−t) (log(y0) + αs+ σE[ws|Ft]) ds
=
∫ ∞
t
re−r(s−t)(log(y0) + αt+ α(s− t) + σwt)ds
= log(yt)
∫ ∞
t
re−r(s−t)ds+ α
∫ ∞
t
re−r(s−t)(s− t)ds
= log(yt) +
α
r
.
So
u¯(y) = Vaut(y)− κ−1yV ′aut(y)
= log(y) +
α
r
− 1
κ
= log(y)− κσ
2
2r
,
where the last line follows from an easy-to-verify equality
α
r
+
κσ2
2r
=
1
κ
. (13)
Applying the inverse utility function u−1(u) = exp(u), we thus get
ct = u
−1(u¯(mt))
= mt exp
(
−κσ
2
2r
)
.
Thus, with log preferences, the agent consumes a constant fraction of his to-date maximal
income mt. Similar calculations show that the optimal consumption process has the same
structure under any CRRA utility function. In particular, if u(c) = (1 − γ)−1c1−γ with γ >
0, γ 6= 1, then the agent’s optimal consumption is given by
ct = mt
(
κ− (1− γ)
κ− (1− γ)α
) 1
1−γ
exp
(
(1− γ)σ
2
2
)
at all dates and states. 
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Next, we provide some basic properties of this contract. Our heuristic discussion provides
simple intuition why this contract is in fact optimal. We postpone the formal verification of this
intuition to subsection 3.5. Also, we still need to check that this contract, which we obtained
as a limit of optimal contracts from relaxed problems, does satisfy all participation constraints
in the unrelaxed problem. We check this later in this section, after we provide basic properties
of the contract.
3.1 Increasing consumption paths
We see in (11) that consumption ct is constant when yt fluctuates below mt. Intuitively,
this is optimal because the agent’s participation constraint is not binding during these times.
Under (11), the agent’s consumption changes only when yt attains a new all-time maximum.
Intuitively, this adjustment is necessary because the participation constraint of the agent binds
at this time. Consistent with this intuition, consumption ct increases when a new all-time
maximum is realized. To see that this in fact is the case, note that u−1 is strictly increasing,
and, by the following lemma, so is u¯.
Lemma 1 u¯ is strictly increasing and u¯ < u.
Proof In Appendix A. 
The above lemma verifies that u−1(u¯(·)) is a strictly increasing function. Since the process
mt is weakly increasing, (11) implies that the agent’s consumption paths are weakly increasing
for any ω. In particular, the agent’s consumption path is constant when yt < mt and it increases
whenever yt = mt. It is a standard result in the mathematics of Brownian motion that yt < mt
at almost all t, and yt = mt occurs on a set of Lebesgue measure zero.
6 Thus, consumption ct
is constant at almost all dates t. Moreover, because u¯ < u, we have that ct < mt at all t. In
particular, we have c0 < y0. This means that the contract begins with net payments from the
agent to the principal, which is akin to prepayment of an insurance premium.
Figure 1 shows a sample path of income yt along with the corresponding path of the state
variable mt and the optimal consumption path ct. Clearly, the path for ct is non-decreasing
and increases when the path for mt does. In fact, because the utility function is CRRA in this
example, ct is a constant fraction of mt.
To better understand the structure of the optimal contract, let us discuss how the optimal
contract delivers the initial utility Vaut(y0) to the agent over time. The monotonicity of the
consumption paths allows us to see this structure very clearly. For any ω, the agent’s utility
flow u(ct) = u¯(mt) is weakly increasing in t. The total discounted utility of the agent, thus,
depends on how fast the utility flow path {u(ct); 0 ≤ t < ∞} attains higher and higher levels.
Note now that for any x > y0, we have u(ct) ≥ u¯(x) if and only if mt ≥ x. Thus,
min{t : u(ct) ≥ u¯(x)} = min{t : mt ≥ x} = min{t : yt = x} = τx. (14)
6See Karatzas and Shreve [12] for proof.
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Figure 1: Optimal consumption under CRRA preferences.
This means that the utility flow u(ct) attains the level u¯(x) for the first time precisely at τx, i.e.,
when income yt hits the level x for the first time. Because the distribution of this hitting time
is known, we can compute the expected speed with which the utility flow paths u(ct) increase.
More precisely, as we are interested in agent’s discounted expected utility, we can compute the
expected amount of discounted time that u(ct) spends above u¯(x), for any x ≥ y0. Using (14),
we have
E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rt1[u¯(x),∞)(u(ct))dt
]
= E
[∫ ∞
τx
re−rtdt
]
= E[e−rτx ]
=
(y0
x
)κ
,
where 1[a,b)(·) is the indicator function of the interval [a, b), and the last line uses (9). Because
the total amount of the discounted time is normalized to unity, 1 − (y0x )κ is the expected
discounted amount of time that the agent’s utility flow spends below the level u¯(x), for any
x > y0. Therefore,
∫∞
y0
u¯(x)d(1−(y0x )κ) represents the total expected discounted utility delivered
to the agent in the contract. By the construction of the contract, we know that this value equals
Vaut(y0).
7
7Taking the limit m→∞ in equation (31) in Appendix A, we can confirm that Vaut(y0) = −
∫∞
y0
u¯(x)d( y
x
)κ,
which means that the contract indeed delivers Vaut(y0).
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It is also worth pointing out that partial insurance is not a transitory phenomenon in our
model. At any t, the probability of a consumption path increase in the future is strictly positive.
This property of the optimal contract is due to the fact that the agent’s autarky value function
does not have a maximum on the support of the agent’s income process in our model. As we
have seen, the optimal consumption path in our model must increase whenever income and
(hence) the autarky value reach a new all-time maximum. For any mt, yt and s > 0, the
probability of yt+s > mt is strictly positive, so the consumption path never settles permanently.
If the support of the agent’s income process were bounded from above in our model, the agent’s
consumption path would be permanently stabilized after income hits its upper bound for the
first time.8
3.2 Continuation value dynamics
Let us now examine the dynamics of the continuation value process vt delivered to the agent
under the contract c in (11). Because consumption cs is determined by ms at all dates s ≥ t,
the knowledge of mt and yt is sufficient to determine the continuation value vt delivered to the
agent. In fact, at all dates and states under the optimal contract (11) we can decompose vt as
follows
vt = E
[∫ τmt
t
re−r(s−t)u¯(mt)ds+ e−r(τmt−t)Vaut(mt)|Ft
]
,
where τmt = mins {s ≥ t : ys = mt} is the first time when yt returns to its to-date maximum
mt. From the above we have that
vt = (1− E[e−r(τmt−t)|Ft])u¯(mt) + E[e−r(τmt−t)|Ft]Vaut(mt), (15)
which means that vt is a weighted average of u¯(mt) and Vaut(mt). From (9), we know that
E
[
e−r(τmt−t)|Ft
]
=
(
yt
mt
)κ
.
We thus have that vt = V (yt,mt) where
V (y,m) =
(
1−
( y
m
)κ)
u¯(m) +
( y
m
)κ
Vaut(m), for any m ≥ y > 0. (16)
The sufficiency of the pair (y,m) to determine the continuation allocation (and therefore the
value to the agent and the cost to the principal) is a remarkable feature of the optimal contract.
In particular, when yt = mt, the contract shows what Kocherlakota [15] and Ljungqvist and
Sargent [18] describe as amnesia: history does not matter, i.e., the continuation contract is the
same for all paths of past income {ys; 0 ≤ s < t}.
8In general, a committed principal will provide the agent with permanent full insurance starting at a point
when the agent’s outside option attains its highest possible value for the first time. For example, if the agent’s
outside option value equals 1 for all yt < K and equals 2 for all yt ≥ K with some K > y0, then the agent
obtains permanent full insurance as of time τK = min{t : yt = K}. After τK , new all-time maxima that income
may attain will not increase the agent’s consumption because his outside option is not further improved when
these maxima are attained.
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Lemma 2 The function V satisfies
(i) 0 < Vy(y,m) ≤ V ′aut(y) with equality only if y = m;
(ii) Vy(y,m) is strictly increasing in y;
(iii) 0 ≤ Vm(y,m) with equality only if y = m.
Proof In Appendix A. 
The above lemma provides a lot of information about the dynamics of the agent’s continu-
ation value process vt under the optimal contract c.
As we have seen in the previous subsection, the optimal contract (11) provides constant
consumption at almost all dates t. However, the continuation value under (11), vt, fluctuates
at all t. This is because the continuation value depends on the distance between yt and mt,
which fluctuates continuously. The larger this distance, the longer the expected waiting time
for the next permanent increase in consumption. Thus, vt is positively correlated with yt at all
times.
This correlation measures the degree of insurance against innovations in income that the
optimal contract provides to the agent. Let us define full insurance against income innovations
at time t as dvt/dyt = 0, no insurance against income innovations at t as dvt/dyt = V
′
aut(yt),
and partial insurance as 0 < dvt/dyt < V
′
aut(yt).
9 Then, the first conclusion in the above lemma
tells us that the optimal contract never provides full insurance, and provides no insurance if and
only when yt = mt. Thus, at almost all times, the contract provides partial insurance against
income innovations.
The partial insurance property is intuitive. When a negative innovation in yt occurs (i.e., yt
goes down), vt suffers because the expected waiting time until the next permanent consumption
hike (i.e., when yt+s achieves yt + ε) lengthens. So vt responds negatively to drops in yt. But
upon any such drop in yt, Vaut(yt) suffers even more because not only the same waiting time
lengthens (i.e., when Vaut(yt+s) climbs up to Vaut(yt + ε)) but also temporary consumption
drops, as ct = yt under autarky, while it does not drop under the optimal contract allocation c
in (11).
This difference between the responses of vt and Vaut(yt) to the innovations in yt shrinks as
yt closes on mt, because the expected duration of smoothed consumption under the optimal
contract decreases as yt approaches mt. Thus, as the second property in the above lemma
demonstrates, the degree of insurance is monotone in the distance between mt and yt. The
farther away yt is from its to-date maximummt, the smaller the effect of an income innovation on
the expected time until the next consumption hike, and so the more stable the continuation value
under the optimal contract. Therefore, the farther away from the boundary of consumption
adjustment an innovation in income takes place, the more fully it is insured.
9Note that the optimal contract under full commitment provides full insurance against the innovations at all
times, while the autarky allocation provides no insurance against innovations at all times.
15
The third property in Lemma 2, Vm ≥ 0, is intuitive. Fix some two paths of past income
{y1s ; 0 ≤ s ≤ t} and {y2s ; 0 ≤ s ≤ t} such that y1t = y2t but m1t > m2t . Consider the continuation
value vit that the optimal contract delivers to the agent under past income history {yis; 0 ≤ s ≤ t}
for i = 1, 2. Because u¯ is strictly increasing, we have u(c1t ) = u¯(m
1
t ) > u¯(m
2
t ) = u(c
2
t ), i.e.,
the agent’s utility flow at t is larger under the income history {y1s ; 0 ≤ s ≤ t}. The same
remains true at all dates s ∈ [t, τm1t ), i.e., as long as the state ms remains below m1t . At date
τm1t , however, the continuation value of the agent will be the same, Vaut(m
1
t ), independently of
the past income history (amnesia). Thus, with the income history {y1s ; 0 ≤ s ≤ t}, the agent
receives a higher utility flow relative to the income history {y2s ; 0 ≤ s ≤ t} during the time
interval [t, τm1t ), and the same continuation value from time τm1t onward along every income
path.10 Thus, v1t > v
2
t , which means that, keeping current income yt fixed, the continuation
value delivered to the agent by the optimal contract is strictly increasing in mt.
Finally, it follows as a simple corollary of Lemma 2 that the contract defined in (11) is
enforceable, i.e., that vt ≥ Vaut(yt) at all dates and states. In fact, we have directly from our
construction of the contract that if yt = mt, then vt = V (yt, yt) = Vaut(yt). For yt < mt,
Lemma 2(iii) implies that V (yt,mt) > V (yt, yt), and so vt > Vaut(yt).
3.3 Optimal contract when V¯ > Vaut(y0)
When V¯ > Vaut(y0), we can obtain the optimal contract from continuation of the optimal
contract that starts at V¯ = Vaut(y0), as this continuation must be optimal (for otherwise the
contract c would not be optimal in the first place). To obtain the optimal contract in this case,
it is enough to modify the initial condition of the state variable. Let m¯0 be defined by
V (y0, m¯0) = V¯ .
Because, by Lemma 2, V (y,m) is strictly increasing in m, a unique solution m¯0 to the above
equation exists for any V¯ ≥ Vaut(y0). At any t ≥ 0, let the agent’s consumption be given by
ct = u
−1(u¯(m¯t)), (17)
where m¯t = max{mt, m¯0}. Note in particular that when V¯ = Vaut(y0), we have m¯0 = y0.
For any y, let us denote the inverse of V (y, ·) by M(y, ·). In this notation, m¯0 = M(y0, V¯ )
and for any pair (y0, V¯ ) the optimal contract is given by ct = u
−1(u¯(max{mt,M(y0, V¯ )})). Our
heuristic derivation makes it clear that this contract is indeed optimal for any pair (y0, V¯ ). We
formally verify this in subsection 3.5.
3.4 Cost to the principal and total contract surplus
In this subsection, we describe the principal’s continuation cost under the optimal contract
c given in (11). In particular, we show that the total surplus of the relationship between the
10Also, the expectation over continuation paths is the same under both past income histories because y1t = y
2
t
and income is a Markov process.
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principal and the agent is strictly positive. In Section 4, we will show that this surplus represents
the size of the optimal borrowing limit for the agent.
Recall first that in the case of full commitment, the agent’s consumption is constant under
the optimal contract. The principal’s cost to deliver a continuation value v to an agent with
current income y is therefore given by
Cf (y, v) = u−1(v)− rP (y), (18)
where u−1(v) is the constant consumption level needed to deliver promised utility v. In the
limited commitment case, denoting the principal’s continuation cost process by Zt, we have
that, at all t, Zt = Z(yt, m¯t), where
Z(y,m) =
(
1−
( y
m
)κ)
u−1(u¯(m)) +
( y
m
)κ ∫ ∞
m
u−1(u¯(x))d
(
1−
(m
x
)κ)− rP (y). (19)
The first term on the right-hand side of this expression represents the expected present value
of the constant consumption flow the agent receives for as long as his income does not exceed
m. The second term is the expected present value of consumption delivered to the agent from
the moment his income hits m onward.11 The third term, rP (y) = ry/(r − µ), is the present
value of the agent’s future income (in flow units).
The total surplus from the relationship between the principal and the agent can be defined
as −C(y, Vaut(y))/r. This quantity represents the amount of profit (measured as a stock)
that the principal can generate by efficiently providing to the agent whose income is y the
autarky value Vaut(y). Under the optimal contract, we have C(y, Vaut(y)) = Z(y, y). Since the
autarkic contract (i.e., ct = yt for all t) generates zero surplus, the surplus from the optimal
contract, which is different from autarky under agent risk aversion, is strictly positive. Thus,
−Z(y, y)/r > 0 for all y.
Example (continued) If utility is logarithmic, u(c) = log(c), then, after substituting ct =
mt exp
(−κσ2/(2r)) in (19) and simplifying, we get
Z(y,m) = m exp
(
−κσ
2
2r
)(
1 +
1
κ− 1
( y
m
)κ)− y r
r − µ. (20)
The total contract surplus is given by
−Z(y, y)
r
= −
(
y exp
(
−κσ
2
2r
)(
1 +
1
κ− 1
)
1
r
− y 1
r − µ
)
= −
(
exp
(
−κσ
2
2r
)(
1 +
κσ2
2r
)
− 1
)
1
r − µy,
where the second line uses (13). Let
ψ = exp
(
−κσ
2
2r
)(
1 +
κσ2
2r
)
. (21)
11Recall that when y = m, then 1− (m
x
)κ is the expected discounted time that the agent’s consumption flow
spends below the level u−1(u¯(x)) for x ≥ m.
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Because exp(x) > 1 + x for any x > 0, we have 0 < ψ < 1. We can now write
−Z(y, y)
r
= (1− ψ) 1
r − µy, (22)
which shows that the total contract surplus is strictly positive and proportional to y. Equiv-
alently, the total contract surplus is a constant fraction of the agent’s human wealth P (y) =
y/(r−µ). Similar calculations show that the same is true for any CRRA utility function. Also,
one can show that with CRRA preferences the contract surplus is strictly increasing in the
coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
3.5 Formal verification of optimality
Our heuristic derivation of the optimal contract c in (11) contains the intuition for why
it in fact is optimal. Because the principal is risk-neutral, it is efficient to provide the agent
with full insurance. Permanent full insurance, however, is not feasible, because of the agent’s
participation constraints. The contract c in (11) is a minimal deviation from permanent full
insurance that satisfies the participation constraints. This heuristic argument must, however,
be verified formally. That is, we need to show that the principal’s cost under this contract, i.e.,
Z(y0,M(y0, V¯ )), in fact equals the minimum cost C(y0, V¯ ) of providing the agent whose initial
income level is y0 with utility V¯ . We provide this formal verification argument in Appendix B.
4 Implementation: savings and hedging accounts
In this section, we show that the optimal contract can be implemented in an arrangement in
which the principal, instead of offering a long-term contract that swaps the income process y for
a consumption process c, offers to the agent a pair of trading accounts: a simple bank account
with a credit line and a hedging account in which the agent can take out insurance against his
income risk. The final allocation is then determined by the agent through his trading activity in
the two accounts. This mechanism is significantly less restrictive than the “direct” mechanism
in which the principal controls the agent’s consumption. Under the two-account mechanism
the agent has much more control over his consumption than he has under the direct long-term
swap contract. Yet, we show that for an appropriate choice of the initial bank account balance
and the credit line process, the final allocation is the same as the optimal allocation given in
(17).
The trading mechanism we consider here is closely related to the one that agents face in
the complete-markets economy with solvency constraints of Alvarez and Jermann [3].12 The
partial-equilibrium implementation result that we present is a restricted version of the general-
equilibrium decentralization result obtained in Alvarez and Jermann [3]. Tractability is an
advantage of our continuous-time model. We are able to characterize the solvency constraints
12See also Krueger and Perri [16] and Krueger and Uhlig [17]. Albanesi and Sleet [1] consider a similar
implementation in an economy with full enforcement, private information, and taxes.
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in detail. In particular, we show that optimal solvency constraints take in our model a simple
form of a borrowing constraint. In addition, by comparing optimal trading arrangements under
limited and full commitment, we show that the borrowing constraint is the only difference
between the two.
4.1 The agent’s problem
The principal offers the agent two accounts: a simple bank account with a credit line and
a hedging account in which the agent can hedge his income risk at fair odds. The interest rate
in the bank account is equal to the common rate of time preference. We will show that under
an appropriate choice of the credit line, this trading mechanism is optimal. By optimality we
mean that the agent trading freely in these two accounts will choose individually the same con-
sumption process as that provided by the optimal contract, and thus will achieve the maximum
utility at the minimum cost to the principal.
Let At denote the agent’s bank account balance process. The asset At is risk-free and pays
a net interest r. The principal imposes a lower bound process Bt ≤ 0 on the agent’s bank
account balance, i.e., At must satisfy
At ≥ Bt, at all t. (23)
Because Bt ≤ 0, the absolute value of Bt represents the size of the credit line that the principal
makes available to the agent within the bank account.
The fair-odds hedging account works as follows. The agent chooses a hedging position
at all t. If the agent’s hedging position is βt at t, then at time t + dt, the hedging account
pays off βt(wt+dt − wt) to the agent. Thus, the agent can use this account to hedge (bet
against) the innovations dwt to his income process. The payoff flow to the agent can be positive
or negative, but its expected value is zero for any choice of the hedging position process βt
because E[βtdwt] = E[βt(wt+dt − wt)] = 0. Thus, the fair-odds price of the hedging asset is
zero.13
The agent chooses his consumption process ct, his bank account balance process At, and his
hedging position process βt subject to the credit limit (23) and the flow budget constraint
dAt = (rAt + yt − ct)dt+ βtdwt, at all t. (24)
The agent’s objective is to maximize the utility of consumption. We will refer to any utility-
maximizing trading strategy as an equilibrium of the two-account problem.
13We could alternatively formulate the hedging account in terms of payoffs contingent on the innovations dyt,
instead of dwt. Because the income process y is not a martingale (unless µ = 0), in the alternative formulation
the principal would have to charge the agent a premium flow of E[βtdyt] = βtµytdt so as to break even. The
formulation we adopt is simpler because E[βtdwt] = 0 for any βt, and so the fair-odds premium is zero. These
two formulations are otherwise equivalent: the properties of the optimal credit limit and agent’s equilibrium
consumption, wealth, and hedging ratio processes are the same in both cases.
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4.2 Implementation
We now show how this two-account trading mechanism can be used to implement the
consumption process obtained in the optimal long-term contracting problem with one-sided
commitment. In that problem, the agent had an option to stop participating (default) at any
time. Here, likewise, at any point in time the agent has the option to exit, i.e., to stop trading
with the principal and stay in autarky forever. If he does, he loses the credit line and access to
hedging with the principal, but can consume his own income {yt+s; s ≥ 0} without having to
repay his debt, if any, to the principal.
We now show that the optimal consumption process ct given in (17), combined with some
trading strategy {βt; t ≥ 0} and asset level process {At; t ≥ 0}, solves the agent’s utility
maximization problem.
Proposition 1 Suppose the borrowing constraint is given by
Bt =
C(yt, Vaut(yt))
r
, (25)
and the agent’s initial assets are
A0 =
C(y0, V¯ )
r
. (26)
Then, under the above trading mechanism, the agent’s optimal consumption and trading strategy
are as follows:
ct = u
−1(u¯(m¯t)),
At =
Z(yt, m¯t)
r
, (27)
βt =
Zy(yt, m¯t)σyt
r
, (28)
where m¯t = max{max0≤s≤t yt, m¯0}, u¯ is given in (12), Z is given in (19), and m¯0 = M(y0, V¯ ).
Proof In Appendix A. 
The credit limit in (25) is our model’s version of the solvency constraints of Alvarez and
Jermann [3]. In the discrete-time model of Alvarez and Jermann, these solvency constraints are
complicated state-contingent restrictions on portfolios of Arrow securities. In our continuous-
time model, these constraints take the simple form of a credit limit.
Our framework allows for a clear characterization of the optimal credit limit. The expression
in (25) succinctly expresses it in terms of current income alone: Bt = B(yt) with B(·) =
C(·, Vaut(·))/r.14 In addition, (25) shows that at any t the agent’s credit limit (the negative
of the borrowing constraint value) equals the total surplus from the relationship between the
14In particular, the size of the credit limit does not depend on the agent’s current asset position or his history
of past income. The function C(·, Vaut(·))/r is a unique representation of the optimal credit limit process as a
continuous function of current income alone. That is, one can show that if Bt is an optimal credit limit process
and Bt = B(yt) for some continuous function B(·), then B(·) = C(·, Vaut(·))/r.
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principal and the agent. The initial asset level (26) determines how this surplus is divided
between the principal and the agent. If A0 = B0, the whole surplus goes to the principal. If
A0 = 0, the whole surplus goes to the agent.
The two-account trading mechanism could also be used in a full-commitment environment
to implement the optimal consumption process ct = u
−1(V¯ ) giving the principal the maximum
profit −Cf (y0, V¯ ), where Cf (y0, V¯ ) is given in (18). It is easy to check that in that case, similar
to (27) and (28), the agent’s equilibrium asset holdings would be given by At = C
f (yt, V¯ )/r
and the hedging process would be βt = −σyt/(r−µ). However, no borrowing constraint would
be necessary in the full-commitment environment.15 The borrowing constraint, therefore, is
the only difference between the implementing mechanisms in the full-commitment environment
and the one-sided commitment model.
Proposition 1 lets us better understand the structure of the optimal long-term risk-sharing
contract by decomposing it into a saving/borrowing component and an insurance/hedging com-
ponent. Perhaps surprisingly, it shows that the limited commitment friction does not necessitate
in our model any restrictions on the size of the agent’s hedging position. This property depends
on the continuity of the agent’s income path. We discuss this property in the next section.
5 Extensions
As we show in (11), the optimal consumption process in our model is given as a fixed,
increasing function of the to-date maximal income. This property of the optimal contract is
not specific to our continuous-time model with geometric Brownian motion income process.
As already mentioned, Zhang [26] shows that our method can be used to study discrete-time
models. In addition, our characterization extends to other models with continuous time. In par-
ticular, it holds for any continuous-path income process under which the derivative of E[e−rτε ]
is continuous at zero. As long as this condition holds, the certainty equivalent utility flow rate,
u¯(y0), can be approximated by the certainty equivalents from relaxed problems, u¯
ε(y0), and our
method of characterizing the optimal contract remains valid.16
In our implementation, as long as the borrowing constraints are enforced, there is no restric-
tion on hedging, i.e., the agent can choose the process {βt; t ≥ 0} with no size restrictions. This
property critically depends on the continuity of the time paths of the bank account balance
process {At; t ≥ 0}. In a discrete-time model, state-contingent solvency constraints necessarily
imply a restriction on the agent’s hedging position at all times. Without such a restriction, the
agent could take out a hedging position paying off enormous amounts in some states of nature
and requiring delivery of enormous amounts in other states. The agent could use this extreme
gambling strategy to obtain a profitable deviation from the desired equilibrium strategy, thus in-
validating the implementation result. In this deviation, which is often called a double-deviation
15In order to eliminate Ponzi schemes, it would be necessary to require that limt→∞ E[e−rtAt] ≥ 0. That
constraint, however, would never bind in equilibrium.
16For example, if the log of the income process is an Ornstein-Unlenbeck mean-reverting process, the formula
for the derivative of E[e−rτε ] can be obtained from Borodin and Salminen [5, page 524, formula 2.0.1].
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strategy, the agent combines the extreme gamble against a subset of the possible states of nature
with default in the states in which his gamble does not pay off. The upside value of this plan
can be made very large while the downside risk is bounded by the value of autarky, which the
agent obtains when he defaults. This makes the double-deviation strategy profitable. In our
model, double deviations cannot provide a large upside potential to the agent because income
sample paths are continuous. Intuitively, this means that in our model, in which the income
shocks are small (and frequent), the agent cannot take a hedging position large enough to ob-
tain a large gamble, which is necessary to make the double-deviation plan profitable. Because
the agent cannot generate a discontinuous time path for his bank account balance, he cannot
violate his borrowing constraint by a meaningful amount. Continuity of the agent’s income path
is important here. In a continuous-time model with discontinuous income paths (for example,
with discrete income shocks arriving as a Poisson process), individual shocks can be large (at
points of income path discontinuity) and gambles with large upside potential are possible. As a
result, asset position paths can have discrete jumps. In such environments, restrictions on the
size of hedging would again become necessary.
In addition, our results can be easily extended to the case of unequal time preference rates
between the principal and the agent. If the principal is more patient than the agent, the agent’s
consumption path drifts down deterministically when participation constraints are not binding
and increases when participation constraints bind. Thus, the optimal consumption path is
non-monotonic and the stationary distribution of consumption may be non-degenerate.
Non-monotonic consumption paths also arise in optimal risk-sharing problems with multi-
sided commitment frictions. We conjecture that our method of characterizing the optimal
contract and its implementation, which we provide in Section 3 for a continuous-time model
with one-sided commitment, can be extended to study optimal risk sharing with multi-sided
commitment frictions. Analysis of the multi-sided case is more challenging because the pattern
of binding participation constraints must be determined for multiple agents at the same time.
The continuous-time setup seems particularly useful in the multi-sided case because it greatly
simplifies the computation of the hitting times that determine this pattern. To illustrate this
point with a concrete example, in Appendix C we solve a continuous-time version of the mutual
insurance problem with two-sided lack of commitment similar to Kocherlakota [15].
6 Conclusion
We view our analysis in this paper as making two contributions. First, we provide a closed-
form characterization of the optimal long-term risk-sharing contract in a dynamic environment
in which the insured agent has a limited ability to commit. We build our construction of the
optimal contract on a simple observation that it is efficient for the principal to provide the agent
with a constant level of consumption whenever the agent’s income process is not at its all-time
high. The maximum level of income attained to-date, therefore, is the only state variable needed
to determine the agent’s current consumption. The geometric Brownian motion structure of the
agent’s income process allows us to give a simple formula, (12), mapping this state variable into
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the optimal level of consumption. This formula lets us characterize precisely the dynamics of
the agent’s continuation value and the principal’s profit under the optimal long-term contract.
Second, we relate our results to the literature studying borrowing constraints as a tool to mit-
igate the risk of borrower default. Existing models deliver optimal borrowing constraints in the
form of complicated restrictions on portfolios of state-contingent assets. Our model shows that
simple borrowing constraints—literally, limits on the amount that agents can borrow—emerge
as the implication of limited borrower commitment in a continuous-time model of optimal risk
sharing. In our model, we show that the optimal credit limit equals the total value of the
surplus generated by the relationship between the principal and the agent.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
We begin by noting that the autarky value function Vaut can be expressed as
Vaut(y0) =
∫ ∞
0
u(y)f(y0, y)dy, (29)
where f(y0, y) is the density of the expected discounted amount of time that the income process
starting from y0 spends at each level y ∈ (0,∞). From Borodin and Salminen [5, page 132], we
know that
f(y0, y) =

r
σ2κ+α
1
y
(
y0
y
)κ
for y ≥ y0,
r
σ2κ+α
1
y
(
y
y0
)κ+2ασ−2
for y ≤ y0,
where κ is the constant given in (10). Differentiating (29) yields
V ′aut(y0) =
r
α+ κσ2
[
κyκ−10
∫ ∞
y0
u(y)y−κ−1dy + (−κ− 2ασ−2)y−κ−2ασ−2−10
∫ y0
0
u(y)yκ+2ασ
−2−1dy
]
.
Then
u¯(y0) = Vaut(y0)− y0
κ
V ′aut(y0)
=
r
α+ κσ2
[
yκ0
∫ ∞
y0
u(y)y−κ−1dy + y−κ−2ασ
−2
0
∫ y0
0
u(y)yκ+2ασ
−2−1dy
−yκ0
∫ ∞
y0
u(y)y−κ−1dy +
κ+ 2ασ−2
κ
y−κ−2ασ
−2
0
∫ y0
0
u(y)yκ+2ασ
−2−1dy
]
=
2r
κσ2
y−κ−2ασ
−2
0
∫ y0
0
u(y)yκ+2ασ
−2−1dy
=
1
κ+ 2α/σ2
y−κ−2ασ
−2
0
∫ y0
0
u(y)yκ+2ασ
−2−1dy
=
∫ y0
0
u(y)d
(
y
y0
)κ+2ασ−2
.
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Because u is strictly increasing, it follows that u¯ is a strictly increasing function and that
u¯(y0) < u(y0) for all y0. 
Proof of Lemma 2
(i) Directly from (12), we have that u¯(y) < Vaut(y) at all y because κ > 0. We can thus see in
(16) that V is strictly increasing in y because the weight on the larger value Vaut(m) is strictly
increasing in y. Indeed, taking the partial derivative in (16), we have
Vy(y,m) = κy
κ−1m−κ(Vaut(m)− u¯(m)) > 0.
To see that Vy(y,m) ≤ V ′aut(y), first note (16) can be written as
V (y,m) = −
∫ m
y
u¯(m)d
(y
x
)κ
+
( y
m
)κ
Vaut(m), (30)
because 1 − ( ym)κ = −
∫m
y d(
y
x)
κ. Note also that definition of u¯(·) allows us to express Vaut(y)
as
Vaut(y) = −
∫ m
y
u¯(x)d
(y
x
)κ
+
( y
m
)κ
Vaut(m), for any m ≥ y > 0. (31)
To see this, note that this equation holds trivially for m = y and the derivative of the right-hand
side with respect to m
κyκm−κ−1u¯(m)− κyκm−κ−1Vaut(m) +
( y
m
)κ
V ′aut(m)
is zero because u¯(m) = Vaut(m) − κ−1mV ′aut(m). Thus, the right-hand side is constant in m.
From (30) and (31) we have
V (y,m)− Vaut(y) = −
∫ m
y
(u¯(m)− u¯(x)) d
(y
x
)κ
.
Introducing a new variable s = xy , we rewrite the above as
V (y,m)− Vaut(y) = −
∫ m/y
1
(u¯(m)− u¯(sy))d
(
1
s
)κ
= κ
∫ m/y
1
(u¯(m)− u¯(sy))s−κ−1ds.
Thus Vy(y,m)− V ′aut(y) ≤ 0 and equality holds only if y = m.
(ii) Since κ > 1,
Vy(y,m) = κy
κ−1m−κ(Vaut(m)− u¯(m))
is strictly increasing in y.
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(iii) We have
V (y,m) =
(
1−
( y
m
)κ)
u¯(m) +
( y
m
)κ
Vaut(m)
= −
∫ m
y
u¯(m)d
(y
x
)κ − ( y
m
)κ ∫ ∞
m
u¯(x)d
(m
x
)κ
= −
∫ ∞
y
u¯(max{m,x})d
(y
x
)κ
.
Thus, Vm(y,m) = −
∫m
y u¯
′(m)d
( y
x
)κ ≥ 0 with equality only if y = m. 
Proof of Proposition 1
We first show that the strategy {ct, At, βt; t ≥ 0} described in the statement of the proposi-
tion is feasible, then prove that it is optimal. Note that At = Z(yt, m¯t)/r = C(yt, V (yt, m¯t))/r ≥
C(yt, V (yt, yt))/r = Bt, thus the borrowing constraint is satisfied. Applying Ito’s lemma to the
martingale ∫ t
0
re−rs(cs − ys)ds+ e−rtZt(yt, m¯t),
we have that the drift of Zt is r(Zt + yt − ct)dt. Applying Ito’s lemma to Zt and noting that
m¯t is monotonically increasing (i.e., no volatility), we have
dZt = r(Zt + yt − ct)dt+ Zy(yt, m¯t)σytdwt.
Therefore,
dAt = (rAt + yt − ct)dt+ r−1Zy(yt, m¯t)σytdwt
= (rAt + yt − ct)dt+ βtdwt,
which shows that the policy {ct, At, βt; t ≥ 0} is budget-feasible to the agent.
To see that {ct, At, βt; t ≥ 0} is optimal, we must argue that the agent cannot do bet-
ter than V¯ . By contradiction, suppose the agent’s optimal plan is {c˜t, A˜t, β˜t; t ≥ 0} and
E
[∫∞
0 re
−rsu(c˜t)dt
]
> V¯ . Then the consumption allocation {c˜t; t ≥ 0} must satisfy the par-
ticipation constraints at every time and under all states because A˜t ≥ B(yt) for all t and the
continuation utility E
[∫∞
0 re
−rsu(c˜t+s)ds|Ft
]
is at least as large as Vaut(yt), due to the optimal-
ity of {c˜t; t ≥ 0}. If the agent follows {c˜t, A˜t, β˜t; t ≥ 0}, the principal’s cost is still A0 because
the principal’s expected return on the fair-odds hedging asset is zero no matter what β˜t is.
Thus, we find an enforceable contract {c˜t; t ≥ 0} that incurs the same cost rA0 = C(y0, v0) to
the principal as {ct; t ≥ 0} but delivers a utility larger than V¯ . This contradicts the fact that
higher promised utility incurs higher cost, i.e., Zm(y,m) ≥ 0. 
Appendix B. Verification of optimality
This appendix provides a formal verification of the optimality of the contract (17).
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First, we express the principal’s cost minimization problem as a dynamic programming
problem with a two-dimensional state vector (y, v), where y is the agent’s current level of
income and v is the current level of the continuation utility that the principal must provide to
the agent.
By Ito’s formula, yt satisfies
dyt = µytdt+ σytdwt, (32)
where µ = α+ σ2/2. In this representation, the income process is decomposed into a drift and
a volatility component. The same decomposition can be provided for the agent’s continuation
value process vt. In particular, the following proposition of Sannikov [23] demonstrates how
the promised utility process v = {vt; t ≥ 0} defined in (3) can be decomposed into the sum of
a drift term and a volatility term.
Proposition 2 Let c be an allocation and v the promised utility process as defined in (3).
There exists a progressively measurable process Y = {Yt,Ft; 0 ≤ t <∞} such that
vt = v0 +
∫ t
0
r(vs − u(cs))ds+
∫ t
0
Ysdws.
Put differently, the evolution of the promised utility process v implied by c can be decomposed
as
dvt = r(vt − u(ct))dt+ Ytdwt. (33)
This decomposition pins down the process Y uniquely up to a subset of measure zero.
Proof See Sannikov [23]. 
In this representation, r(vt − u(ct)) is the drift of the promised utility process vt and Yt is
the sensitivity of vt to income shocks dwt.
In our problem, the Dynamic Principle of Optimality implies that efficient contracts in Ψ
are representable by a pair of real-valued policy rules (c(yt, vt), Y (yt, vt)), where c : Θ → R++
and Y : Θ→ R. With these policy rules we can express the law of motion for the state vector
(yt, vt) as
dyt = µytdt+ σytdwt,
dvt = r(vt − u(c(yt, vt)))dt+ Y (yt, vt)dwt.
This law of motion and the policy rules can be repeatedly applied to generate the sensitivity
process Y (y0, V¯ ) = {Yt(y0, V¯ ); t ≥ 0} and the contract allocation c(y0, V¯ ) = {ct(y0, V¯ ); t ≥ 0}
for any initial (y0, V¯ ) ∈ Θ.
The cost function C(yt, vt), i.e., the cost of an optimal contract starting from the state
(yt, vt), must satisfy the necessary Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation given as (see, for
example, Fleming and Soner [8, equation (5.8), page 165]):
rC(yt, vt) = min
c,Y
{
r(c− yt) + Cy(yt, vt)µyt + Cv(yt, vt)r(vt − u(c))
+
σ2y2t
2
Cyy(yt, vt) + σytY Cvy(yt, vt) +
Y 2
2
Cvv(yt, vt)
}
, (34)
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where subscripts on C denote partial derivatives, and at the boundary vt = Vaut(yt) the controls
(c, Y ) must be such that vt+dt ≥ Vaut(yt+dt) with probability one. Otherwise, the agent would
revert to permanent autarky with positive probability, which would be inefficient.
Denote the cost under the contract (17), Z(y,M(y, v)), by J(y, v). We can now show that
J(y, v) satisfies the HJB equation (34).
Proposition 3 J(y, v) satisfies the HJB equation.
Proof Consider a contract starting at (y0, V¯ ) = (y, v) ∈ Θ. Recall in the contract u(ct) =
u¯(mt) = u¯(M(yt, vt)). Define
Gt =
∫ t
0
re−rs(cs − ys)ds+ e−rtJ(yt, vt).
Because
Gt = E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rs(cs − ys)ds|Ft
]
,
we have that Gt is a martingale, and thus its drift is zero. Calculating this drift by applying
Ito’s lemma and the fact that the volatility of V (y,m) is Vyσy, and setting time equal to zero,
we get
r(u−1(u¯(m))− y)− rJ(y, v) + Jyµy + Jvr(v − u¯(m))
+
1
2
Jyy(σy)
2 + Jyv(σy)
2Vy +
1
2
Jvv(σy)
2V 2y = 0,
which is the HJB equation, except for the minimization operator. To verify that in fact
r(u−1(u¯(m))− y)− rJ(y, v) + Jyµy + Jvr(v − u¯(m)) + 1
2
Jyy(σy)
2 + Jyv(σy)
2Vy +
1
2
Jvv(σy)
2V 2y
= min
u,Y
{
r(u−1(u)− y) + Jyµy + Jvr(v − u) + 1
2
Jyy(σy)
2 + JyvσyY +
1
2
JvvY
2
}
,
it suffices to show that Jv = (u
−1)′(u¯(m)) and Vy = −Jvy/Jvv.
To see the first of these equalities, recall from the proof of Lemma 2(iii) that Vm =
− ∫my u¯′(m)d( yx)κ. From (19) we calculate the partial derivative Zm = − ∫my (u−1)′(u¯(m))u¯′(m)d( yx)κ.
Since J(y, v) ≡ Z(y,M(y, v)), we have
Jv = ZmMv =
Zm
Vm
= (u−1)′(u¯(m)).
To see the second equality, note Jv(y, V (y,m)) = (u
−1)′(u¯(m)) is independent of y when Jv
is interpreted as a function of (y,m). Thus, we have that Jvy+JvvVy = 0. Thus Vy = −Jvy/Jvv.
Therefore the HJB is verified. 
We have thus verified a necessary condition for optimality. The next proposition shows
sufficiency.
Proposition 4 J = C, i.e., that the contract c constructed in (17) is efficient.
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Proof Let N > 0 be any positive number and define Θ(N) = {(y, v) ∈ Θ : 0 < y ≤
N, v ≤ Vaut(N)}. Pick an initial condition (y, v) ∈ Θ(N) and consider an auxiliary dynamic
programming problem in which we remove the participation constraints after the hitting time
λ = mint {t : vt = Vaut(N)}. Note that, since vt ≥ Vaut(yt) when t ≤ λ, we have λ ≤ τN . An
implication of removing participation constraints is that the optimal consumption is perfectly
smoothed after λ, i.e., ct = u
−1(Vaut(N)) for t ≥ λ, even as income yt continues to fluctuate.
To study the auxiliary problem, we can restrict attention to the interior of Θ(N), where the
law of motion of the state variable is the same as before. The cost function on the boundary
∂Θ(N) = {(y, v) ∈ Θ : v = Vaut(N)} is the full-commitment cost, i.e., C(N)(y, Vaut(N)) =
u−1(Vaut(N))− ryr−µ , because consumption is perfectly smoothed from the date λ on. The cost
function C(N)(y, v) in the interior is by definition the cost of the optimal policies in the auxiliary
dynamic programming problem. To solve the auxiliary problem, we make the same guess as
before, i.e., consumption satisfies
ct = u
−1(u¯(m¯t)),
where m¯t = max{mt,M(y, v)}. We define, for m ∈ [y,N ],
Z(N)(y,m) = −
∫ N
y
u−1(u¯(max{x,m}))d
(y
x
)κ
+ u−1(Vaut(N))
( y
N
)κ − r
r − µy.
First, we show that the function J (N) defined as J (N)(y, v) = Z(N)(y,M(y, v)) is the optimal
cost function C(N)(y, v). To see this, note that J (N) satisfies the HJB on the state space Θ(N),
rJ (N)(y, v) = min
c,Y
{
r(c− y) + J (N)y (y, v)µy + J (N)v (y, v)r(v − u(c))
+
σ2y2
2
J (N)yy (y, v) + σyY J
(N)
vy (y, v) +
Y 2
2
J (N)vv (y, v)
}
.
Pick any contract {c˜t; t ≥ 0} starting from the initial condition (y, v) ∈ Θ(N). Denote the
volatility term of v˜t in Proposition 2 by {Y˜t; t ≥ 0}. We introduce, for each n ≥ 1, the stopping
time
Tn = inf
t
{
t ≥ 0 :
∫ t
0
Y˜ 2s ds ≥ n or v˜t ≥ Vaut(N)
}
.
We define
Gt =
∫ t
0
re−rs(c˜s − ys)ds+ e−rtJ (N)(yt, v˜t).
Apply the Ito’s lemma to Gt and obtain
Gt∧Tn = G0 +
∫ t∧Tn
0
e−rs
[
r(c˜s − ys)− rJ (N)(ys, v˜s) + J (N)y (ys, v˜s)µys + J (N)v (ys, v˜s)r(v˜s − u(c˜s))
+
σ2y2s
2
J (N)yy (ys, v˜s) + σysY˜sJ
(N)
vy (ys, v˜s) +
Y˜ 2s
2
J (N)vv (ys, v˜s)
]
ds
+
∫ t∧Tn
0
e−rs
[
J (N)y (ys, v˜s)σys + J
(N)
v (ys, v˜s)Y˜s
]
dws.
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Since
∫ t∧Tn
0 e
−rs[J (N)y (ys, v˜s)σys+J
(N)
v (ys, v˜s)Y˜s]dws has zero mean and the drift is non-negative,
taking expectation, we see that
E[Gt∧Tn ] ≥ G0 = J (N)(y, v).
In particular E[Gn∧Tn ] ≥ J (N)(y, v). Since limn→∞ n ∧ Tn = λ, E[
∫∞
0 c˜sre
−rsds] < ∞ and
E[
∫∞
0 ysre
−rsds] <∞, the dominated convergence theorem yields
E
[∫ λ
0
re−rs(c˜s − ys)ds
]
= lim
n→∞E
[∫ n∧Tn
0
re−rs(c˜s − ys)ds
]
. (35)
Furthermore, since J (N) is bounded, limn→∞ e−r(n∧Tn)J (N)(yn∧Tn , v˜n∧Tn) equals e−rλJ (N)(yλ, v˜λ) =
e−rλJ (N)(yλ, Vaut(N)), and the bounded convergence theorem implies
E
[
e−rλJ (N)(yλ, Vaut(N))
]
= lim
n→∞E
[
e−r(n∧Tn)J (N)(yn∧Tn , v˜n∧Tn)
]
. (36)
Combining (35) and (36), we get
E
[∫ λ
0
re−rs(c˜s − ys)ds+ e−rλJ (N)(yλ, Vaut(N))
]
= lim
n→∞E[Gn∧Tn ] ≥ J
(N)(y, v).
This means that J (N)(y, v) is (weakly) less than the cost of any other contract {c˜t; t ≥ 0}, i.e.,
J (N) = C(N).
Second, since the auxiliary problem has less constraints than the original problem, the cost
of the auxiliary problem is below that of the original problem, i.e., for all N > 0,
J (N)(y, v) ≤ C(y, v), for all (y, v) ∈ Θ(N).
Taking limit N →∞, we have
J(y, v) = −
∫ ∞
y
u−1 (u¯(max{x,M(y, v)})) d
(y
x
)κ − r
r − µy
= lim
N→∞
(
−
∫ N
y
u−1(u¯(max{x,M(y, v)}))d
(y
x
)κ
+ u−1(Vaut(N))
( y
N
)κ)− r
r − µy
= lim
N→∞
J (N)(y, v)
≤ C(y, v).
Thus we have J(y, v) = C(y, v) for all (y, v) ∈ Θ. 
Appendix C. Optimal risk sharing without commitment
Consider two agents with identical period utility functions u(c) = − exp(−c). The income
process of agent i = 1, 2, denoted by
{
yit; t ≥ 0
}
, is given by, respectively, y1t = σwt and y
2
t =
−σwt, where wt is a standard Brownian motion, and σ > 0. Hence, there is no aggregate risk and
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the two agents are symmetric. We are looking for an optimal risk-sharing contract between these
two agents. As in Kocherlakota [15], we assume that neither agent can commit, so the contract
(allocation of consumption) must be self-enforcing: at all times both agents’ participation
constraints (PCs) must be satisfied, which means that for both agents the continuation value
under the contract must be at least as large as the value of reverting to permanent autarky.
Assuming that the agents’ common rate of time preference r is larger than σ2/2, the autarky
value function, which by symmetry is the same for both agents, can be computed here in
closed-form:
Vaut(y
i
t) = u(y
i
t)F, (37)
where F =
(
1− σ22r
)−1
> 1.
Because y1t + y
2
t = 0 at all t, any efficient allocation must have c
2
t = −c1t . We now state two
additional properties that efficient allocations must satisfy in this model: symmetry and scala-
bility.17 Suppose at some t agents’ incomes are (y1t , y
2
t ) = (y¯,−y¯), and let
{(
c¯1t+s, c¯
2
t+s
)
; s ≥ 0}
be an efficient continuation allocation delivering continuation values (v1t , v
2
t ) = (v¯
1, v¯2). The
following two properties hold. First, if (y1t′ , y
2
t′) = (−y¯, y¯) at some t′, then the continuation
allocation
(
c1t′+s, c
2
t′+s
)
=
(
c¯2t+s, c¯
1
t+s
)
for all s ≥ 0 is efficient and delivers continuation values
(v1t′ , v
2
t′) = (v¯
2, v¯1). Second, if (y1t′ , y
2
t′) = (y¯+k,−y¯−k) for some t′ and k, then the continuation
allocation
(
c1t′+s, c
2
t′+s
)
=
(
c¯1t+s + k, c¯
2
t+s − k
)
for all s ≥ 0 is efficient and delivers continuation
values (v1t′ , v
2
t′) = (exp(−k)v¯1, exp(k)v¯2). We will call these two properties, respectively, sym-
metry and scalability.
We will now use a heuristic argument similar to that in Section 3 to qualitatively characterize
efficient allocations of consumption in this environment. In our informal exposition, we will
invoke the symmetry and scalability properties described above. After that, as in Section 3
again, we will use a relaxed version of this contracting problem to compute the solution. The
closed-form expression for the distribution of a Brownian motion hitting time will be very useful
in this computation.
Qualitative properties
Clearly, as there is no aggregate risk in this model, full insurance for both agents is feasible
as long as both agents’ participation constraints are slack. Any efficient allocation, therefore,
will give constant consumption flows to both agents at all times at which no PC binds.
Let us start out from an initial condition in which the PC of agent 1 holds as an equality.
This means that agent 1’s continuation value at t = 0 is equal to Vaut(y
1
0) = Vaut(0), i.e., agent 1
is indifferent between staying in the contract and defaulting to autarky. Thus, agent 1 receives
no surplus from this insurance relationship as of time zero, and agent 2 receives the whole
surplus. At this point, we do not know the size of the surplus. We will denote the value that
17These properties follow from the assumption that both agents have identical exponential (i.e., CARA) utility
function and their income processes are random walks with the same distribution. Due to space constraints, we
do not provide formal proofs in this appendix, but we can make them available upon request.
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agent 2 obtains under this initial condition by Vmax(y
2
0) = Vmax(0).
18 If Vmax(0) = Vaut(0), the
surplus from the relationship is zero. This means that each agent can get at most his autarky
value, i.e., no insurance can be sustained. If Vmax(0) > Vaut(0), the surplus is positive and the
PC of agent 2 is slack, which makes some insurance sustainable.
In particular, starting from this initial condition, insurance can be sustained along those
sample paths in which wt decreases (goes negative) immediately after t = 0. When wt decreases,
y1t decreases and y
2
t increases. The autarky value of agent 1 thus decreases and his PC is relaxed,
i.e., it becomes non-binding. At the same time, the autarky value of agent 2 increases and thus
his PC becomes tighter. But because the PC of agent 2 was slack at t = 0, it will remain slack
for some time as wt becomes more and more negative. As both agents’ participation constraints
are slack, efficiency requires full risk sharing during that time, so both agents’ consumption is
constant.
Constant consumption, however, will not be sustainable forever. Consumption will have
to be adjusted when one agent’s PC becomes binding. Starting from the initial condition
described above, the PC of agent 1 will bind as soon as y1t increases above its initial value
of zero. Alternatively, if y1t stays below zero, the PC of agent 2 will become binding when
wt becomes sufficiently negative, y
2
t sufficiently positive, and the autarky value of agent 2
sufficiently high. Let us denote the level of y2t at which this will take place by 2a. Full risk
sharing can be sustained for as long as y1t remains below zero and above −2a. If y1t crosses
zero, consumption of agent 1 must be increased in order to satisfy his participation constraint.
Because aggregate income remains constant, this means that consumption of agent 2 must at
that point decrease. If y1t crosses −2a, which means that y2t crosses 2a, consumption of agent 2
must be increased in order to satisfy his participation constraint. At that point, consumption
of agent 1 must decrease.
Let us now consider the agents’ continuation values when y1t hits −2a. Because the PC of
agent 2 binds, clearly, his continuation value equals Vaut(2a). Symmetry implies that agent 1’s
continuation value is Vmax(−2a), as his PC is maximally slack at this point and thus he gets
the whole surplus from the relationship. Note that the transfer of the surplus from agent 2 to
agent 1 that take place while y1t drops from zero to −2a provides insurance to agent 1.
We can now compute the levels of the constant consumption flow the two agents receive
during the time interval in which y1t stays between zero and −2a. Agent 1 gets some level x,
and agent 2 gets −x. If we switched the two agents’ positions so that the PC of agent 2 were
binding at t = 0, then, by symmetry, agent 2 would be getting consumption x. But the PC of
agent 2 in fact does bind when y1t hits −2a. By scalability, therefore, agent 2’s consumption
at this point must be x + 2a, because y2t equals 2a when y
1
t hits −2a. Since consumption is
constant over this time interval, agents 2’s consumption is the same at time zero and at the
time when y1t hits −2a, which means −x = x+ 2a. Solving for x we get that agent 1 consumes
18In general, we will define Vmax(y
2
t ) as the maximum value that agent 2 can get out of the insurance relation-
ship with agent 1 when income of agent 2 is y2t . By symmetry, Vmax(y
1
t ) equals the maximum value that agent
1 can get out of this insurance relationship when his income is y1t . Thus, the same functional form, Vmax(·),
applies to both agents.
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−a and agent 2 consumes a over this time interval.
After consumption is updated because of a binding PC for agent 1 or 2, the agents face the
same contracting problem as at t = 0, with possibly two differences. First, the roles of agent 2
and 1 may be reversed depending on whose PC is currently binding. Second, the income levels
of the two agents, although adding up to zero, may be non-zero. By symmetry and scalability,
however, optimal risk-sharing starting from this new initial condition takes the same form as
it did starting from the original initial condition: consumption will be stabilized until the next
time the PC of one of the agents binds.
Following Thomas and Worrall [24] and Ljungqvist and Sargent [18, chap. 20], we can
express the efficient allocation we have just descried in terms of a “participation-ensuring”
interval [y1t −a, y1t +a], and the following updating rule for consumption c1t : Keep consumption
c1t constant unless doing so would cause it to fall outside of the participation-ensuring interval
[y1t −a, y1t +a]. When updating c1t , change it by the smallest amount necessary to keep it inside
the interval [y1t − a, y1t + a].
In the initial condition described above, the initial participation-ensuring interval is [−a, a].
With c10 = −a, consumption of agent 1 is at the very bottom of the participation-ensuring
interval as of t = 0. As soon as y1t exceeds 0, the interval shifts up and the bottom end of
it bumps agent 1’s consumption up. Consumption of agent 2 at this point decreases. On the
other extreme, if y1t does not exceed zero but rather falls to −2a, the participation-ensuring
interval shifts down to [−3a,−a] and its upper end bumps c1t down, which means that c2t is
bumped up, consistent with agent 2’s PC binding at this point. As long as y1t does not exceed
0 or fall below −2a, however, c1t remains inside [y1t − a, y1t + a], which means that both c1t and
c2t stay constant.
To compute the solution, we need to jointly determine the function Vmax(·) and the number
a. This task is simplified in our model by the fact that Vmax(·) is proportional to Vaut(·). To
see this, note that the scalability property of this model implies that
Vmax(y
i
t) = Vmax(0) exp(−yit) (38)
for both i and any yit. From (37) and (38), the ratio
Vmax(y
i
t)
Vaut(yit)
= −Vmax(0)F−1
does not depend on the level of income yit. Denote this ratio by g ∈ (0, 1]. For both i and any
yit, we can now write (38) as Vmax(y
i
t) = gVaut(y
i
t). Solving for the optimal allocation, thus,
boils down to finding two constants: a ≥ 0 and 0 < g ≤ 1.
Computation
We are now ready to follow the approach from Section 3 of the paper, which lets us char-
acterize a and g. We fix a small  > 0 and consider a relaxed problem. Let τ be the stopping
time when income y1t first reaches one of the boundaries of the relaxed participation-ensuring
32
interval [−2a, ]. Agent 1’s expected utility from this contract (equal to his autarky value) can
be split into the part before and after time τ as follows:
Vaut(0) = E
[∫ τ
0
re−rtu(−a)dt+ e−rτ1{y1τ=−2a}Vmax(−2a) + e−rτ1{y1τ=}Vaut()
]
,
where 1{y1τ=x} is the indicator set of all paths of Brownian motion {wt; t ≥ 0} such that y1τ = x.
In this formula, as we have discussed informally earlier, along the sample paths in which y1t
reaches −2a before it reaches ε agent 1’s continuation utility at t = τ is Vmax(−2a) because
agent 2’s participation constraint binds and the whole surplus is at that point given to agent
1. Using Vmax(−2a) = gVaut(−2a), we can write the above as
Vaut(0) = E
[∫ τ
0
re−rtu(−a)dt+ e−rτ1{y1τ=−2a}gVaut(−2a) + e−rτ1{y1τ=}Vaut()
]
. (39)
Because g is not known, we cannot use this equation alone to compute a. This contrasts
with the one-sided commitment model studied in Section 3, where we could compute the agent’s
consumption level before time τ without knowing the size of the total contract surplus Vmax(·).
This is because in the one-sided limited commitment model there is only one possible reason
for adjusting consumption: the single uncommitted agent’s participation constraint binds. We
know that when this happens, the agent’s continuation utility equals his autarky value. In
Section 3, we used this fact to compute the initial optimal consumption level using just the
autarky value function Vaut(·) and the expected discounted hitting time E [e−rτ ]. In the two-
sided case, in order to compute an agent’s consumption we need to know the continuation value
that will be delivered to an agent in the event in which the other agent’s participation constraint
binds. This value, however, depends on the size of the surplus from the relationship, which a
priori is unknown.
We can resolve this, however, by obtaining for agent 2 a condition analogous to (39). Because
we assumed that the whole contract surplus as of t = 0 goes to agent 2, his total expected utility
as of time zero is Vmax(0) = gVaut(0). In the relaxed problem, this total expected utility value
can be split into the part before and after time τ as follows
gVaut(0) = E
[∫ τ
0
re−rtu(a)dt+ e−rτ1{y1τ=−2a}Vaut(2a) + e
−rτ1{y1τ=}gVaut(−)
]
, (40)
which gives us the second equation we need to solve simultaneously for a and g. Note that we
have substituted in this formula gVaut(−) for Vmax(−), the value of agent 2’s continuation
utility when y1t reaches .
Brownian motion allows us to compute the discounted stopping time in closed-form:
E
[∫ τ
0
re−rtdt
]
=
1− e(−2a)
√
2r/σ
1 + e(−2a−)
√
2r/σ
(1− e−
√
2r/σ),
E[e−rτ1{y1τ=−2a}] =
e−2a
√
2r/σ − e(−2a−2)
√
2r/σ
1− e2(−2a−)
√
2r/σ
,
E[e−rτ1{y1τ=}] =
e−
√
2r/σ − e(−4a−)
√
2r/σ
1− e2(−2a−)
√
2r/σ
.
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Following the steps in Section 3, i.e., taking  to zero and simplifying terms, we express (39)
and (40) as a system of two non-linear equations with two unknowns (a, g):
Vaut(0) =
(1− e−2a
√
2r/σ)2
1 + e−4a
√
2r/σ
u(−a) + 2e
−2a√2r/σ
1 + e−4a
√
2r/σ
gVaut(−2a) (41)
+
1− e−4a
√
2r/σ
1 + e−4a
√
2r/σ
V ′aut(0)
1√
2r/σ
,
gVaut(0) =
(1− e−2a
√
2r/σ)2
1 + e−4a
√
2r/σ
u(a) +
2e−2a
√
2r/σ
1 + e−4a
√
2r/σ
Vaut(2a) (42)
−1− e
−4a√2r/σ
1 + e−4a
√
2r/σ
gV ′aut(0)
1√
2r/σ
.
This system always has autarky (i.e., a = 0 and g = 1) as a solution. Although hard to
solve analytically, this system is inexpensive to study numerically. Our numerical explorations
(details of which we do not include here) show that autarky is the only solution if the volatility
parameter σ is low, but solutions that sustain insurance (i.e., such that a > 0 and g < 1) exist
if σ is sufficiently high. This result is very intuitive when we note that the agents’ value of
autarky is decreasing in σ. With low volatility, the autarky value is high, so the participation
constraints are tight to the point that no insurance can be sustained, i.e., autarky is efficient.
When we increase the volatility parameter σ, the agents’ value of autarky decreases. This makes
autarky less desirable and thus relaxes the participation constraints. For sufficiently high σ,
autarky becomes inefficient, i.e., agents are able to sustain mutual insurance despite high (full,
in fact) persistence of the income shock in this model.
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